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Intent, Interpretation, and Implications
By Anna Afshar
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
n March 31, 2005, the first
round of data reflecting the most
recent revisions to the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
became publicly accessible.
Containing previously unavailable
information on loan pricing, lien sta-
tus, and loan type, the new statistics
have captured the attention of the
financial community. Mortgage com-
panies, banks, community develop-
ment organizations, and consumer
groups alike are eager to see what the
new data tell us about the workings of
the home mortgage market, especial-
ly the fast-growing segment of sub-
prime lending. Questions are rapidly
surfacing about how to interpret the
information and how much it can
reveal about equity and efficiency in
the market. To address these con-
cerns, the Federal Reserve System, in
partnership with other regulatory
agencies, is working to increase over-
all understanding of both the intent
behind HMDA and the strengths and





























sHMDA’s Purpose and the
Intent of the Most Recent
Changes
The Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act was enacted by Congress in 1975 to
ensure fair and equal access to credit in
the housing market. Originally, the law
was intended to address concerns that
banks and thrifts were “redlining” low-
and moderate-income areas, uniformly
rejecting all loan applications from
these poorer neighborhoods.  HMDA
sought to end this discriminatory prac-
tice by requiring banks to make publicly
available data on where their mortgage
loans were made. The dataset provided
a mechanism to monitor whether finan-
cial institutions were adequately supply-
ing housing credit in the geographic
areas they served. 
Since then, the law has been
revised several times to reflect the evolu-
tion of the mortgage market. In the late
1970s, concerns surfaced that some
lenders were discriminating based on
the race and income of a borrower. In
response, HMDA was revised in 1980
to require lenders to report each loan
applicant’s income and race. In 1988,
HMDA was expanded to cover mort-
gage lending subsidiaries of bank hold-
ing companies, a move prompted by the
growing number of financial institu-
tions moving their mortgage operations
into such entities. In 1989, HMDA was
further amended to require data collec-
tion on loan applications, not simply on
loans that were approved and originat-
ed. This change was intended to allow
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for the identification of differing denial
rates by race, gender, or income.
The most recent revisions to
HMDA have once again updated the law
to address emerging trends in the mort-
gage market. Over the last decade, the
development of credit scoring technology
and risk-based pricing models has
allowed lenders to better determine the
risk profile of borrowers. This has led to a
proliferation of loan products and prices,
the most notable being subprime loans—
higher-priced loans associated with high-
er-risk borrowing. According to the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, sub-
prime loans accounted for 18.7 percent
of all mortgages in 2002, up from only
1.4 percent in 1994. 
The growth of the subprime market
has generally been a positive develop-
ment, affording mortgage credit to a new
population of previously unqualified bor-
rowers and contributing to record levels
of homeownership—69 percent of U.S.
households were homeowners in 2004,
up from 64 percent a decade before.
However, subprime lending has led to an
increasingly complex mortgage market,
prompting concern among consumer
groups that borrowers may have difficul-
ty obtaining the best-priced loan for their
needs. Concerns center around four
broad themes:
First, borrowers in the subprime
market are seemingly less likely to com-
parison shop for mortgages than borrow-
ers in the prime market. 
Second, there is a significant amount
of aggressive marketing in the sub- 
prime market.  
Third, some question whether con-
sumers in the subprime market are
equipped with enough knowledge to pro-
tect themselves from unfair or deceptive
lending practices.  
Fourth, there is concern that price
variation in the subprime market may
reflect discrimination against borrowers
by race, ethnicity, income, or gender, not
legitimate risk-based pricing. 
In response to these concerns,
HMDA was amended in 2002 to require
mortgage lenders to report data related to
the pricing of loans. These changes,
which went into effect in January of
2004, were intended to enhance the
capacity of regulators to monitor sub-
prime lending and continue to ensure
equity and efficiency in the mortgage
market as a whole.
The New Reporting
Requirements
Among the 2002 HMDA changes
are four new reporting requirements.
Garnering the most attention is a lender’s
obligation to report “the spread” of each
originated high-cost loan. Calculated as
the difference between the interest rate
on the mortgage loan and that on a U.S.
Treasury security of comparable maturity,
the spread captures the “price of the loan”
vis-à-vis what other borrowers are paying.
The relative nature of this measure
enables comparisons over time, regardless
of changes in the level of interest rates.
Because the spread on prime loans is rel-
atively small, this reporting requirement
pertains only to “higher-cost mortgage
loans.” For first-lien mortgage loans,
lenders must report the spread if it is 
3 percentage points or more.  For second
mortgages, or subordinate-lien loans,
which typically have higher interest rates,
the cut off is 5 percentage points. 
The definition of “higher-cost mortgage
loans” is based solely on the interest 
rate spread and does not take into
account points or other fees associated
with the loan. 
The remaining new reporting
requirements are also focused on under-
standing price differentials in the mort-
gage market. For all mortgage loan appli-
cations and originations, lenders must
now report lien status, a significant deter-
minant of loan price. A lien gives a lender
ownership rights to an asset in case of
default, and home loans secured by a lien
generally have lower interest rates.
Moreover, first-lien loans tend to have
lower rates than subordinate-lien loans,
as the first-lien lender has the initial
rights to the asset, while the lender of a
subordinate-lien loan has rights only to
what is not claimed by the first lien.  By
requiring lenders to indicate whether a
loan is secured by a first- or subordinate-
lien, regulators can determine how much
price variability is explained by the lien
status of a loan.
For similar reasons, lenders must 
also identify whether a loan application
involves a manufactured home. Com-
pared with site-built homes, factory-built
homes are perceived to be riskier by
financial institutions, in part because
they can be owned separately from the
land on which they are located. Thus, the
market for manufactured homes is char-
acterized by higher interest rates and a
greater frequency of denials. In 2002,
while the denial rate on all home pur-
chase loan applications was just under 14
percent, an estimated 60 percent of man-
ufactured home applications were reject-
ed. HMDA data will now identify loan
applications associated with manufac-
tured homes, allowing regulators to
examine this market separately and take
into account its unique characteristics.
Finally, financial institutions are
now required to flag whether a loan
exceeds the price thresholds of the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA).  Part of the Truth in Lending
Act, HOEPA seeks to protect consumers
from deceptive and unfair practices in
home lending. It imposes additional
restrictions and requirements on first-lien
loans with spreads exceeding 8 percent-
age points, subordinate-lien loans with
spreads exceeding 10 percentage points,
and all loans with points or certain fees in
excess of the larger of $510 or 8 percent
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of the loan. Lenders now must clearly
label any loans that trigger HOEPA
restrictions, permitting more explicit
monitoring of these high-priced loans.
What the Data Can and
Cannot Reveal
Today, HMDA statistics are collect-
ed to assist with three broad goals: 
(1) Provide an indication of whether or
not financial institutions are serving com-
munities’ housing needs; (2) Enable pub-
lic officials to target public-sector dollars
in order to attract private investment to
areas where it is needed; (3) Identify
potential discriminatory lending prac-
tices. Of these, the third goal draws the
most public attention. 
Until recently, differences in denial
rates across various groups provided the
best available indication of potential dis-
crimination in the mortgage market.
However, with the emergence of new
loan products, this limited measure has
become less relevant as discrimination is
increasingly possible in the pricing of
credit, not solely in its denial. By provid-
ing new information on loan prices, the
2004 HMDA data present the first
opportunity to test for potential discrim-
ination via pricing differentials.
However, it is crucial to understand pre-
cisely what can and cannot be deter-
mined about discrimination from the
new information.    
In general, the new HMDA infor-
mation may provide an indication of
whether discrimination is occurring
through price differentiation, but it can-
not offer definitive proof. There are
numerous factors that determine the
price of a home loan. While HMDA
reporting requirements capture some of
these factors, such as the lien status of the
property, many more are not identified.
For example, some of the most pertinent
measures of a borrower’s credit risk are
not reported under HMDA, including a
borrower’s credit score and debt-to-
income ratio. Additionally, many impor-
tant factors related to the property are
omitted—the ratio of the loan amount to
the value of the property and whether
home prices in the neighborhood are ris-
ing or falling. Further, HMDA does not
include information about the lender’s
costs. While it would be helpful for regu-
lators and the public to have access to
these and other pricing factors, when the
Federal Reserve Board crafted the
HMDA changes in 2002, it had to care-
fully weigh the benefit of such informa-
tion with the burden its collection would
place on lenders. 
Without these additional pricing
factors, it is impossible to determine from
the HMDA data alone whether lenders
are engaged in any type of abusive or dis-
criminatory activity.  For example, sup-
pose two borrowers want to buy in the
same census tract and have the same
approximate level of income, but
Borrower A is black and Borrower B is
white.  Borrower A receives a home 
Highlights of the New HMDA Reporting Requirements
Reporting Requirement Applies To
Loan Price Report the difference, or spread, between the • First-lien loans with a spread of 3 percentage 
interest rate on the loan and that on a U.S. points or more.
Treasury security of comparable maturity. • Subordinate-lien loans with a spread of 5 
percentage points or more.
Lien Status Indicate whether there is a lien on the loan, • All loans 
and if so, whether it is a first- or 
subordinate-lien.
Type of  Indicate whether the home is • All loans 
Structure • a single family home,
• a multi-family home, or
• a manufactured home.
HOEPA Status Indicate that the loan is subject to the  • First-liens loans with a spread of 8 percentage   
requirements of the Home Ownership  points or more.
and Equity Protection Act. • Subordinate-lien loans with a spread of 10 
percentage points or more.
• Loans with points or certain fees in excess 
of the larger of $510 or 8 percent of the 
loan amount.
The new HMDA 
data may indicate whether
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purchase loan with less favorable terms
than Borrower B, that is, the spread
reported for Borrower A is larger. Using
HMDA data, a comparison of these 
two borrowers might suggest that racial
discrimination is responsible for the 
difference in the price of their home
loans. However, further examination
reveals that Borrower A has a lower cred-
it score and a higher debt-to-income ratio
than Borrower B and wants to buy a
home in a portion of the census tract
where prices are falling. With this new
information, the lender’s decision looks
rational, not discriminatory. 
Notwithstanding the limitations,
the data do provide an initial screening
mechanism for the presence of discrimi-
nation in the mortgage market.  When a
particular pattern of pricing differences
shows up in the HMDA data for partic-
ular lenders, loan products, or geograph-
ic regions, regulators can decide if the
matter warrants further investigation. If
so, they can review actual loan applica-
tions, which include many of the pricing
factors discussed above, to try to deter-
mine the cause of the price differential.
More generally, the new data enable reg-
ulators to monitor overall trends in loan
pricing within the subprime market. 
In September, the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors will release its first
report on the new HMDA data. The
report will summarize loan activity for
every mortgage lender in each metropol-
itan area in which the lender does busi-
ness. Separately, the report will provide
an aggregate profile of lending in each
metropolitan area. Finally, the data will
be totaled by lender, race, and ethnicity
for the nation as a whole.  The report will
provide the first comprehensive picture
of mortgage lending in the nation using
the new data and will permit compar-
isons both within and between geograph-
ic regions. In addition, the Board plans to
undertake an extensive analysis of the
new pricing data, intended to raise ques-
tions and considerations that may lead to
further research, changes in the regula-
tion, or public policy initiatives.  
Implications for the
Mortgage Industry
Overall, the public disclosure of
home loan pricing data has the potential
to impact the mortgage industry in the
following ways:
1. Improve oversight by regulators.  
Regulatory agencies can now more
easily detect and analyze patterns of price
differentials for different lenders, product
types, geographic areas, and racial and
ethnic groups. Equipped with this
screening mechanism, regulators can rule
out discrimination in some instances and
efficiently target their resources toward
cases of potential discrimination, thereby
aiding the overall enforcement of fair-
lending laws.
2. Increase accountability for lenders. 
Public access to pricing data on sub-
prime loans gives lenders an added incen-
tive to strengthen their internal review
process in order to detect any potential
price discrimination. Moreover, if an
organization’s HMDA data suggest
potential problems, the institution will
want to investigate and correct any prob-
lems in order to avoid bad publicity. 
3. Enhance understanding of 
communities’ credit needs. 
Consumer advocacy groups may
confront various lenders about particular
pricing patterns revealed in the data,
requiring institutions to respond in
greater detail about how lending 
decisions are made. Discussions about
particular credit risks associated with a
population or geographic area may
ensue, helping both consumer groups
and lending institutions to better under-
stand the barriers to credit availability in
certain neighborhoods.
4. Encourage competition in the 
subprime market.
By identifying areas with a high con-
centration of high-cost loans, the new
data may entice lenders to enter these
markets.  Enhanced competition in these
areas may increase the availability of
credit and weed out overpriced loans.
Responsive Regulation
The 2002 changes to HMDA reflect
regulators’ latest response to the public’s
ever evolving concerns about equity and
efficiency in the market for housing cred-
it. The new data will enhance under-
standing of the nation’s mortgage lending
industry and offer a first look at pricing
practices in the subprime market. It will
still not be possible to answer all ques-
tions about the presence of discrimina-
tion in the mortgage market, but the new
data will offer a starting point to identify
pricing patterns that deserve further
scrutiny.  In the coming months and
years, analysis of the new data will raise
questions, invite conversation, inspire
research, and shape public policy that
will further the goal of fair and equal
access to credit for housing. 
Anna Afshar is a Senior Research
Associate at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston.
Other HMDA Changes
In addition to the new disclosure requirements, a number of methodological
changes to HMDA reporting will impact year-to-year data comparisons. For
example,there are new categories for race and ethnicity, and the definitions for
metropolitan and micropolitan areas have been amended to conform with those
of the U.S.Office of Management and Budget.For a complete description of the
changes that affect the 2004 HMDA data, please visit the Federal Reserve
System’s web site at www.federalreserve.gov.
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